Substantial evidence existed to affirm Circuit Court’s findings that Appellant was at maximum medical improvement. Appellant was not entitled to have her doctor designated as authorized treating medical provider. Appellant was entitled to travel expenses. Appellant was entitled to future medical treatment under Dodge v. Bruccoli, 334 S.C. 574 (Ct. App. 1999).
Turner worked for DHEC and injured her back during a fire drill. The Commissioner found that Turner had a 30% permanent partial disability to her back and that she was at maximum medical improvement. Turner appealed, arguing that she was not at maximum medical improvement and entitled to additional medical treatment and benefits. The Appellate Panel affirmed the single Commissioner in full. The Circuit Court remanded the case to the Commission to make more specific findings of fact. The Commission did so and Turner again appealed to the Circuit Court, arguing that the Commission’s findings of fact were not adequate; substantial evidence did not support the Commission’s decision regarding her injuries; that she was entitled to ongoing and future medical treatment; that her own doctor should have been designated as authorized treating physician; and that she was entitled to reimbursement for travel expenses.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held that the findings of fact set forth by the Commission were sufficiently detailed. Further, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decision that Turner was at maximum medical improvement and entitled to a 30% permanent partial disability award. DHEC conceded that Turner was entitled to future medical care under Dodge v. Bruccoli, and the Commission’s Order was modified to reflect an award of future medical treatment. The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Turner’s assertion that she was entitled to have her own doctors designated as her authorized treating physician, holding that S.C. Code Ann. §§ 42-15-60 and 42-9-10 establish the rights of the employer and employee with regards to payments for medical treatments and ultimately gives great deference to the Appellate Panel. The statute does not give a unilateral right to claimants to select their treating physician, and such a right would undermine the authority of the Appellate Panel. Lastly, the Court agreed that Turner was entitled to reimbursement to travel expenses and remanded the case to determine how much Turner was due.
